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I. INSIGHTS FROM CAFA AND FROM FEDERALISM
What does the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) 1 teach us
about federalism? A first lesson is that, when confronted with state-
based decision making of which they disapprove, national lawmakers
federalize rights, as they have repeatedly done throughout United
States history. In 2005, Congress turned to the federal courts because
CAFA's proponents believed that state courts were too welcoming of
collective adjudication. CAFA is part of a cohort of enactments and
doctrinal developments of this era that preempt state decision making
and push litigants toward noncollective and nonadjudicative remedies
such as privately sponsored arbitration programs.
CAFA's reliance on federal courts to deal with aggregate litigation
parallels decisions made in the 1960s to revise the Federal Rules of
2Civil Procedure to facilitate the aggregation of parties and claims.
The mechanism-federalization-is the same, but the goals are not.
In the 1960s, Rule 23 was redrafted to expand class action opportuni-
ties for claimants in the federal courts. By easing access, rulemakers
wanted to maximize the enforcement of federal rights, which they
perceived to be under-protected in state courts, especially when state
actors were charged with discrimination. In 2005, the purpose was,
once again, to offer an alternative to state courts, perceived by then to
have over-protected rights for various kinds of plaintiffs. Thus, a sec-
ond lesson to be drawn from the enactment of CAFA is how quickly
substantive "national" goals can change-aimed now at deploying fed-
eral courts to very different ends.
Turning the question around to ask what federalism teaches us
about CAFA yields other insights. A review of the history of the inter-
actions between state and federal governance results in a third lesson,
that efforts to centralize authority in the federal government and to
exclude the states are not likely to endure. In this federation, national
rule pronouncement regularly relies on local implementation. Fifty
years after Brown v. Board of Education,5 localjudgments about school-
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context:
A Preliminay View, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1439, 1484-89 (2008); Edward Purcell, Jr., The
Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform,
156 U. PA. L. REv. 1823, 1851 (2008).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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ing, housing, and spending continue to shape opportunities for inte-
grated schools. Further, local officials are regularly pressed by con-
stituencies-troubled by the warming climate, the safety of the prod-
ucts that they use, the acceptance of same-sex marriage, or the
inequalities around them-to pursue welfare and safety in ways differ-
ent from those pursued at the national level. Concurrent, overlap-
ping, and sometimes conflicting legal regimes are part and parcel of a
federalist system.
Fourth, local decision making does not occur in isolation. Rather,
state policies and laws are regularly shaped through the interaction of
state officials crossing their own borders as well as those of the nation.
As localities try to make judgments about legal rights and remedies,
they look to their colleagues domestically and sometimes internation-
ally-borrowing proposals on global warming or product safety and
adapting them to local conditions. The interactions across localities
have increased as government officials work, translocally as well as
transnationally, through national organizations of local officials such
as the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National Governors Association,
and the National League of Cities. While CAFA may try to centralize
decision making at the national level in an effort to assert the United
States' sovereign interests, pressures from local and transnational lev-
els function as "political safeguards, 4 that limit concentrations of
power through countervailing mechanisms that produce other policy
judgments.
From the density and richness of such translocal initiatives comes
a fifth lesson: CAFA's efforts to diminish the role of aggregate-rights-
claiming will not succeed. Joint endeavors by local officials and their
national organizations are themselves a form of aggregation,
prompted by the need for collective responses to problems that affect
large numbers of persons. Like the invention of the class action rules
in the 1960s, the development of translocal organizations is likewise
innovative.
These national networks of local actors function as "political safe-
guards" that check exclusive national authority, but they are not them-
selves intrinsically "safe." Rather, their power raises questions that are
familiar in the class action and political science literatures-about the
adequacy of representation by spokespersons for the group, the com-
4 See generally Herbert Weschler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543
(1954), discussed infra text accompanying note 151.
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monality of interests among members, and the opportunities of mem-
bers to participate so as to inform and to monitor their representa-
tives.-' Further, some of these national networks raise new questions
for social movement theory, which has been focused on networks of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) rather than on these volun-
tary national, private entities gaining authority by virtue of their mem-
bers holding local and state offices. Thus, I propose capturing their
presence through the term "transnational organizations of govern-
ment actors," or TOGAs, as I begin below to interrogate their contri-
butions both to federalism and to aggregation.
II. ASSESSING THE IMPORT OF CAFA
CAFA's innovations have to be put in the context of the many de-
bates about whether and how to revise the 1966 class action rule. In
1999, four years before the amendments that put the current version
of Rule 23 into place,6 the University of Pennsylvania Law Review also
held a symposium raising many of the issues on the table now, but
with a focal point differently described. The topic then was "Mass
Torts," and panelists assessed the handling of such claims through
multidistrict litigation, class actions, and bankruptcy. Participants in-
cluded academics, practitioners, several federal judges, and a few state
court judges. At that time, the idea of federalizing state-based causes
of action seemed remote, but one federal judge spoke forcefully about
the need to bring state courts, which he perceived to be unduly per-
missive, under control.
The paper I presented focused on what I called the "'F' word," re-
ferring to the question of lawyers' fees, a topic that had not been
named on the program or in the many proposals for reform that were
then pending. But fees were and are central to producing the mar-. 8
ketplace of mass tort lawsuits.
5 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 21 (1996);Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorneys Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991).
6 See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 215 F.R.D. 158, 162-69
(2003).
' See Symposium, Mass Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1851 (2000).
8 SeeJudith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119,
2146, 2149 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, Money Matters].
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That hesitancy to confront directly the dominant role of money in
aggregate litigation reflected the general etiquette of the civil justice
system, which does not often face the haunting problem of the costs
entailed in making good on the promise of access to justice. Class ac-
tions provide a kind of subsidy for certain litigants who, if not part of a
group, would lack the resources (in terms of economic ability and
knowledge) to pursue claims. Aggregating claims is a complex dy-
namic that can have effects that vary depending on the nature of the
claim, its remedy, and the diversity of claimants within the group ag-
gregated. For example, through bringing in some claimants otherwise
left out, aggregation can affect the value of the claims as a set, thereby
producing redistribution among plaintiffs in that some high-end
claims may lose value while some low-end claims can gain value. Fur-
ther, aggregation endows certain players (mostly lawyers) with the
power to be spokespersons for groups, thereby raising questions about
how to monitor their loyalty and the quality of their work. When law-
yers receive fees based on awards to large numbers of individuals, ag-
gregation often gives such lawyers economic stakes that exceed those
of any individual class member.
Over the decades of class action practice, judges took on tasks of
appointing lead counsel and awarding fees. Given that power to
choose and to pay lawyers, I argued, "in mass torts,judges are the mar-
ket"; through decisions about which lawyers to select and how to com-
pensate them, judges alter "demand and supply by shaping aggregates
and settlements, by valuing certain forms of lawyering, and by direct-
ing capital not only to lawyers but to a host of subsidiary service pro-
viders."9 The creation of rules for aggregation thus generates new liti-
gation markets in which various participants become stakeholders,
and if enough of them are vested in the status quo, regulatory inter-
ventions are hard to achieve. But, as shown in 2005 by CAFA, inter-
ventions are not impossible once various forces are politically aligned.
By then, the code word of "mass torts" no longer quite fit, in part
because some of the perceived problems involved consumer, envi-
ronmental, and property claims. CAFA embraces another term, again
beginning with "F," here standing for "fairness." As this Symposium's
title makes plain, naming the problem as "fairness" does not necessar-
ily make for a frank discussion of its parameters. CAFA can be read to
have several different targets: bad acting by lawyers and litigants in
need of judicial control, bad acting by state court judges in need of
9 Id. at 2129.
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federal control, and bad acting by trial judges in need of appellate
control.
The technique chosen by Congress in the name of "fairness" relies
on a third "F" word: "federalism." Congress divested state courts of
jurisdiction over cases formerly called "state cases" (in the sense that
the causes of action arose under state law) because Congress saw fed-
eral judges as better able to police the perceived misbehaviors that
caused "unfairness." Some members of Congress hoped that, through
federalization, they would accomplish a form of fee regulation in that
CAFA's proponents assumed that many federal judges would not cer-
tify classes in some cases in which state courts had certified or likely
would have certified. l The market for litigation and fee awards will
under such assumptions be constrained because, through federal
oversight, many claims will lose value. (Whether that view of federal
judges is correct is of course a question, raised at the Symposium by
the Honorable Lee Rosenthal, who had served as the chair of the judi-
cial subcommittee that had dealt with Rule 23 revisions and who now
chairs the Standing Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States. l l )
A. A Range of Appraisals
As the rich papers and discussion for this Symposium make plain,
exploration of CAFA's import for federalism (and sometimes for fair-
ness and fees) is well underway. Thus far, one can find four basic
evaluations of CAFA's relationship to federalism.
A first is that CAFA marks a significant change in the contempo-
rary landscape 12 and, further, that this intervention is both important
and positive. Supporters argue that federalization of state court class
actions was a necessary response to national markets.1 3 To think of
cases involving nationwide corporate actors as "state" cases is a mis-
nomer, goes this argument, and thus CAFA appropriately redefines
10 See Purcell, supra note 2, at 1868-69.
11 Lee H. Rosenthal, U.S. Dist. Judge, S. Dist of Tex., Remarks at the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium: Fairness to Whom? Perspectives on the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (Dec. 1, 2007); see also Lee H. Rosenthal, Back in the Court's
Court, 74 UMKC L. REV. 687, 706-07 (2006).
12 See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of
the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 2035, 2131 (2008).
13 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53
UCLA L. REv. 1353, 1415-20 (2006).
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them as "national" lawsuits and properly places them under the con-
trol of federaljudges.
Under this approach, one could also read CAFA as congressional
approval and confirmation of what federal judges were, in some
measure, already doing." Celebrants of CAFA sometimes further ar-
gue that federal judges ought to give CAFA a robust reading (statutory
maximalism, rather than minimalisml"), interpreting it as a form of
protective jurisdiction that can license federal judicial lawmaking."'
More energetic yet is the claim that CAFA ought to be understood as
creating a carve-out under Erie 7-authorizing and welcoming federal
common lawmaking in areas in which Congress could prescribe sub-
stantive rules of law but has not yet done so. i
A second approach to CAFA bemoans its enactment. While shar-
ing with those who approve of CAFA a view of its significance, these
critics take the opposite attitude towards its content. The argument
posits that CAFA is both a big and a bad development because (a)
CAFA is an unfair incursion on state authority, and (b) the incursion
was done in service of corporate America to limit liability for defen-
dants, thereby reducing protections and remedies for tort and con-
sumer plaintiffs."' Stephen Burbank has a distinctive but related cri-
tique: that the enactment was done without sufficient transparency
and, instead, in a "fog of ambiguity and hypocrisy." 20 Kevin Clermont
and Theodore Eisenberg proffer another layer of criticism: that CAFA
was poorly drafted, failing to specify burdens of proof or standards for
14 See Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 858, 866-71 (1995). To the extent that "they" (federal judges) were
doing "that" (tort reform), Congress could be read to have given its approval in CAFA.
15 Cf CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SU-
PREME COURT (1999).
16 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The ma-
jority read the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 as authorizing federal judges
to supply common law rules of decision. The decision is also known for its dissent, ex-
ploring whether-if the Act had not provided substantive federal lawmaking author-
ity-Congress could have given jurisdiction over the claims to the federal courts. See id.
at 469-484 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See generally Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The
Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 542 (1983); Paul J. Mishkin,
The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 195 (1953).
17 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
18 See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Erie Doctrine Repealed by Congress?, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1629 (2008); Suzanna Sherry, Overruling Erie: Nationwide Class Actions and Na-
tional Common Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2135 (2008).
19 Edward Purcell details this position along with others taken during the debates
about CAFA's enactment. See generally Purcell, supra note 2, at 1889-1904.
20 Burbank, supra note 2, at 1445-48.
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allegations of amount in controversy, and therefore has resulted in the
waste of litigants' and courts' resources as they grapple with the stat-
ute's applications.'
A third reading of CAFA seeks to lower the decibel level by arguing
that it was neither as important nor as innovative as proponents and
opponents claim. Modest aims and doctrinal continuity may be a help-
ful way to summarize the shape of that claim, exemplified here in the
Article by Richard Marcus, which argues that CAFA nests inside various
other doctrinal shifts.22 A related approach is offered by Linda Silber-
23man, who could be read as calling for statutory minimalism. Silber-
man argues that one ought not to make CAFA more than it is. She
urges judges not to take the license for management as a license for
lawmaking. Rather, in her view, CAFA has provided neither a general
grant to make law nor a grant to make federal choice of law rules, tasks
that she puts directly to Congress. 4
A fourth approach-CAFA as a "federalism sleeper," if you will-is
offered by Professor William Rubenstein, who focuses on CAFA's re-
quirements that notice of proposed settlements must be given to state
attorneys general as well as to federal officials.2 ' These statutory man-
dates offer new opportunities for public officials to play significant
roles in affecting the value of cases and the terms of settlements. That
potential impact undercuts a reading of CAFA as unilaterally enhanc-
ing federal authority at the expense of state actors and argues instead
that the statute will result in shifting power to state actors.
B. Commonalities (to Borrow a Term)
Here I offer a fifth approach that, as my title suggests, aims to ex-
tract insights into federalism and aggregation by linking CAFA with
other developments, both historical and contemporary. I begin below
by looking back over the last several decades to show the structural
21 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste
and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1553 (2008).
22 See Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA's Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L.
REv. 1765 (2008).
23 See Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA.
L. RET. 2001 (2008). Again, I borrow Cass Sunstein's description of what he sees as a
form of constitutional interpretation. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 15.
24 See Silberman, supra note 23, at 2031.
25 See William B. Rubenstein, The Public Role in Private Governance: Some Re-
flections on CAFA's Early Experience 3 (Nov. 19, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (Supp. V 2005)).
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commonalities between the 1966 Class Action Rule 26 and CAFA. One
part of my claim is that, in some respects, CAFA mimics the 1966 revi-
sions that it displaces. Both enactments turned to the federal courts
to implement federal norms by overseeing state actors. While substan-
tive visions of which federal norms ought to be implemented differ
significantly, the structural gesture-the turn to the federal courts as
instruments of policy implementation-is shared.
Both the 1960s Class Action Rule and CAFA are of their time, em-
bedded in and consistent with a much larger legal landscape. The
drafters of both had aspirations for federal courts to affect perceived
"rule of law" problems in states. Both enactments were aimed at put-
ting federal judges in the driver's seat. And both the 1960s and the
2005 reforms represent attitudes embraced and shared by different
actors at the national level: Congress, the federal judiciary, and rule
drafters.
The distinctions between Rule 23 (circa 1966) and CAFA (circa
2005) reflect changes in the aspirations about what federal judges
should be doing. Rule 23 raised the federal flag in favor of a robust
role for adjudication in regulation. CAFA lowers that flag. Rule 23
invited the possibility of federal judicial oversight of state officials if
they violated federal rights. Of central concern then was the en-
forcement of antidiscrimination norms in the face of de facto and de
jure segregation. CAFA also invites federal judicial oversight of state
judges, seen at this juncture to be overenforcing consumers' and tort
victims' rights at the expense of national economic vitality. In these
respects, CAFA mirrors the 1966 class action regime that it disrupts, in
that it both exemplifies and embodies normative claims about the role
of federal courts, federalism, and large-scale litigation.
Moreover, both examples of procedural innovation are part of a
set of interconnected legal developments emanating at legislative and
judicial levels. The views that shaped the 1960s Class Action Rule also
yielded substantive new federal legislation on civil rights and statutes
such as the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.7 The atti-
tudes that underlie CAFA find expression in a cohort of related provi-
sions, such as the expansion of the doctrines of preemption that, like
CAFA, seek to assert national sovereign authority. One vivid example
26 See FED R. Civ. P. 23 (1966).
27 Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(2000)).
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is the doctrinal reinterpretation of the breadth of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act which, like CAFA, divests state courts ofjurisdiction.
C. The Resiliency of Collective Action
My second claim is that CAFA is misguided in presuming that the
centralizing authority of the "national" courts will prove to be a long-
lasting method for definitive resolutions of aggregate allegations of
wrongdoing. CAFA proposes to delineate a set of problems as distinc-
tively "national," as if that category were solid, rather than vulnerable
to both local and international activities.
Below, I provide a few examples of how networks of translocal ac-
tors, sometimes borrowing from abroad through transnational net-
works, have crafted policies and laws with national effects.-9 The re-
sulting redundancy is at the core of a federalist view of properly
diffused power-holding. The resiliency of redundancy makes the em-
pirical argument that hard questions do not lead to stable or everlast-
ing answers. Such layered, competing, and complementary regulatory
regimes-within federalism in the United States and through transna-
tional interactions-are both unavoidable and desirable.
Moreover, those counterpressures are now expressed in part
through new forms of aggregation-twentieth-century organizations
of translocal actors that provide further evidence of the impulse to-
ward collective action. To substantiate these claims, I turn to examine
the 1960s and 2005 class action reforms to understand their respective
approaches to access to courts, rights-claiming, and federalism.
III. CELEBRATING FEDERAL RIGHTS-CLAIMING: THE 1960s
CLASS ACTION RULE IN ITS TIME
The 1960s rulemaking was part of a larger story aimed at using the
federal courts for regulatory enforcement of federal rights. The rele-
vant players included the Supreme Court, Congress, and the rule draft-
ers, all of whom were interested in facilitating access to federal courts
for litigants to enforce newly articulated national rights. As Benjamin
Kaplan, the Harvard Law professor who served as reporter for the 1960s
rule revisions, put it in 1989, the class action "rule was not neutral: it
did not escape attention at the time that it would open the way to the
28 Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000)); see infra
notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
29 See infra Part V.
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assertion of many, many claims that otherwise would not be pressed; so
the rule would stick in the throats of establishment defendants."3 0
One can learn about the goals of the drafters from the minutes of
the 1960s rulemaking committee, the notes to the rules, and the arti-
cles written by Benjamin Kaplan.3" As the drafters explained, they had
created different "kinds" of class actions, with one particularly focused
on plaintiffs in need of declaratory or injunctive relief ("23(b) (2)
classes") and another identified by being subjected to common treat-
ment by a defendant ("23(b) (1) classes").
Of particular concern was the enforcement of school desegrega-
tion orders after schoolchildren had graduated from their segregated
environments.12 Class action status authorized courts to oversee im-
plementation during the decades required to bring about change.
The 1966 reforms made possible lawsuits that empowered federal
judges to decide whether state officials in schools, as well as in jails,
prisons, mental hospitals, and social-welfare agencies, were violating
federal rights and, if so, to craft long-term remedies to redress those
injuries.
The drafters also wanted to use class actions to bundle relatively
low-value claims to attract lawyers and prompt them to bring cases en-
forcing federal statutory rights in areas such as securities and antitrust
law. 3 The federal courts had developed an equitable theory of award-
ing attorneys' fees based on a lawyer and his or her client conferring a
"common benefit. '' 34 As a result, cases involving small claims but large
enough classes would be sufficiently lucrative for lawyers to take the
risk of filing cases.
Where is federalism in this story? These various plaintiff groups
welcomed by the class action rule were then relatively new to the fed-
30 Benjamin Kaplan, Commentary, Comment on Carrington, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2125,
2126-27 (1989). Thanks to Stephen Subrin for pointing me to this commentary.
31 1 detail the archival sources in From "Cases" to "Litigation,"54 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5, 6-15 (1991) [hereinafter Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation"]. Professor Kap-
lan explained his project in Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356 (1967) [hereinafter Kaplan,
Continuing Work].
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 102
(1966) (explaining that civil rights actions are "illustrative" of the purpose of Rule
23(b) (2) and listing several school desegregation cases as examples).
33 See id. (noting that Rule 23(b)(2) is "not limited to civil rights cases" and de-
scribing several potential commercial applications).
SeeJudith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the
Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 296, 298-309 (1996).
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eral courts. As Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen Yeazell have de-
tailed, schoolchildren, prisoners, and social-welfare recipients had not
been rights-holders under federal law; they also had neither lawyers
nor other resources to pursue their claims. 35 The innovative proce-
dural form of class actions thus improved the enforcement of federal
rights, often against state and local defendants. As for the focus on the
consumer, securities, and antitrust cases, the drafters of Rule 23 as-
sumed that groups of plaintiffs, assisted by lawyers attracted by fees,
would enable federal judges to enforce federal regulations aimed at
corporate misbehavior.
In their efforts to ease access to the federal courts, civil rulemakers
did not rely on the class action rule alone. Their project was integrative,
in that they addressed multiparty rules as a related packet. Coupled
with opportunities for discovery and other statutory innovations, the
leaders of the bench and bar who wrote those rules were of the view
that bringing lawsuits was a positive method of regulating misbehavior.
The 1966 class action reforms had doctrinal and legislative coun-
terparts of the same era-new rights to counsel in criminal cases,3 the
creation of the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) in 1974,37 and the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 38-that sought to
equip litigants seeking relief in court. 9 Central to this story was the
enactment of new federal substantive rights, exemplified by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Housing Act, the Clean Air Act, and the
like.40  Yet another facet is the Supreme Court's decision in United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, affirming federal power over pendent state
15 See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Ex-
traordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REv. 465 (1980).
36 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
37 See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378
(1974).
38 Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(2000)).
In this context, the Supreme Court's limitation on the 1966 Rule in Eisen v.
Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175 (1974), requiring that plaintiffs bear the costs of
identifying and sending notice to all members of 23(b) (3) class actions, was subjected to
a great deal of criticism for undercutting the utility of the Rule. See, e.g., Kenneth W.
Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It, 1974 SUP. CT. REX'. 97. The judicial response to
the 1966 rule may be paralleled in the response, reported by Clermont and Eisenberg,
ofjudicial reluctance to implement CAFA. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 21, at
1579-84.
40 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284
§§ 801-819, 82 Stat. 81 (1968); Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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claims and thereby outlining the contours of a doctrine now called
supplemental jurisdiction.4'
One more piece of the allocation ofjurisdiction between state and
federal courts of that era needs to be excavated before moving for-
ward forty years. The 1960s rule drafters thought that their new class
action rule did not and should not cover torts.4 2 In a once-famous
comment to 23(b) (3), the drafters advised against tort class actions:
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily
not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that signifi-
cant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liabil-
ity, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these
circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class action would de-
generate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.4 3
As one can see from this text, the 1960s drafters had three reasons
why class actions were not "right" for such tort cases. First, the drafters
thought that tort plaintiffs had little need for the equipage provided
by their new procedures. Unlike many consumers (including some
individuals who were stockholders) who had small damage claims that
were not attractive to lawyers, the system of contingent fees enabled
tort plaintiffs to obtain legal assistance.44 In contrast, when individuals
were "without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at
all," class actions were needed to vindicate rights.
4'
Second, the drafters thought that the distinctions among tort vic-
tims (even if involved in the same incident)-as to fact and to law-
made aggregation inappropriate or very difficult. The then-paradigm
tort cases were personal injuries from car accidents or medical mal-
practice, and hence the sense of individualization was strong. In Kap-
lan's words, "individual questions of liability and defense will over-
41 383 U.S. 715 (1966). The Court explained that, if "a plaintiff's claims are such
that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then,
assuming sustainability of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the
whole." Id. at 725 (emphasis omitted). In the era of Gibbs, the terminology used was
"pendent" and "ancillary" claims and parties. The current statute addressing these
ideas speaks of"supplementaljurisdiction." See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
42 1 analyzed the interaction and development of this approach, and its reflection
in the minutes and letters of the Advisory Committee in Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litiga-
lion, " supra note 31, at 6-15.
43 See FED. R. Ctv. P. 23 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 103
(1966).
44 Benjamin Kaplan stated that "where the stake of each member bulks large and
his will and ability to take care of himself are strong," class treatment was not necessary.
Kaplan, Continuing Work, supra note 31, at 391.
45 Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969).
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,,46whelm the common questions. Further, at the time, large cases
(then called "mass accidents") were exemplified by a train wreck, or a
plane crash, or a fire at a circus or in a hotel. Not in sight were what
has come to be: mass consumer tort cases involving harms from asbes-
tos, smoking, pharmaceuticals, and environmental hazards. Further,
to the extent that concerns about duplication were then apparent,
federal judges responded by facilitating the consolidation of cases al-
ready filed through proposing the enactment of the multidistrict liti-
gation statute. 47 That statute, in turn, coupled with the bankruptcies
in the 1980s of Johns-Manville and A.H. Robins, helped to frame the
S 48
plausibility of bundling mass torts into class actions.
Third, the drafters of the 1960s Class Action Rule thought that
class treatment of tort cases was not "right" given their views on feder-
alism. Unpacking the federalism threads of the 1960s class action dis-
cussion brings me to the topic of diversity jurisdiction. Recall that Erie
was in its heyday in the 1960s 49 and that Hanna v. Plumer5 was decided
while the drafters were working on what became the 1966 Rule. More-
over, in the 1960s, the Judicial Conference of the United States was
officially on record as supportive of continuing diversity jurisdiction,
albeit with some limitations.
46 Kaplan, Continuing Work, supra note 31, at 393.
47 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
48 See Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation, "supra note 31, at 28-35 & n.103.
49 As Silberman notes, "[T]he federal courts in these class action choice of law
cases felt bound under Erie... to adopt the choice of law approach of the respective
states in which they sat, and thus were limited as to how they might expressly shape
choice of law to accommodate aggregate litigation." See Silberman, supra note 23, at
2015; see also Sherry, supra note 18, at 2138-39.
50 380 U.S. 460 (1965). That decision, which concluded that the state method of
service of process need not be used, underscored the authority of federal procedural
rules to govern diversity cases.
51 In the 1930s, federal judges were proponents of diversity jurisdiction, which has
long been a significant portion of the docket. Indeed, when a proposal to abolish di-
versity was pending in the 1930s, neither Chief Justice Hughes, presiding at the Con-
ference of Senior Circuit Judges (the predecessor of the Judicial Conference of the
United States) nor his colleagues were enthusiastic about that proposal. Yet the group
thought that it would be inappropriate and inept to submit a formal statement in op-
position. Moreover, the Conference thought that its power to report on the "business
of the federal courts" did not authorize it to opine on the wisdom of the proposed re-
configuration of federal jurisdiction. SeetJudith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as In-
jury: Transforming the Meaning ofArticle 11, 113 HARv. L. REV. 924, 962-63 (2000).
Furthermore, before 1938 and the Erie decision, diversity cases provided federal
judges with opportunities to fashion federal rules of decision. Diversity jurisdiction
thus served as a vehicle for federalization, in that judges developed national common
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By then, however, opposition to diversity was growing within the
federal judiciary. As civil fights cases were gaining their persona as
"national" or "federal" cases pushing filings upward, efforts were made
to differentiate and designate other cases as "state" cases-lawsuits
that may have found their way onto the federal docket but had a lesser
claim to it. Working with Chief Justice Earl Warren, in 1969 the ALI
completed its overview of federal and state court jurisdiction; its re-
port proposed making access to federal courts for federal claims easier
by eliminating the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 . At the same time, the ALI also affirmed important arenas for
state court authority.
Similarly, materials such as the Annual Reports of the Judicial
Conference of the United States (the policymaking body within the
federal judiciary) do not then suggest distrust of state lawmaking on
torts. To the extent that state judges were shaping new liability rules
and remedies, so were federal judges in other kinds of cases. More-
over, a drumbeat against expansion of federal jurisdiction ("federali-
zation") was beginning as judges bemoaned growing caseloads as well
as the doctrinal elaboration of rights. By 1977, under Chief Justice
Warren Burger, the Judicial Conference officially announced its sup-
port for the abolition of diversity jurisdiction, as the Conference be-
gan to shape arguments that Congress had turned too much and too
often to the federal courts.
law and created incentives for lawyers to bring cases in federal court to be governed by
those precepts.
52 ALl, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTs 172-76 (1969). As the study explained, "the stated requirement of an amount
in controversy in fact has relatively little impact on the volume of federal question liti-
gation. The few cases there are, however, that must satisfy the § 1331 requirement are
likely to involve matters particularly deserving of a federal forum." Id. at 172. Further,
the simple fact that more cases might be better--or more efficiently-tried in
a federal court is not of itself sufficient justification for such jurisdiction. The
problems involved here [in the discussion of multiparty, mtltistate diversity]
do not relate simply to trial efficiency at large, but grow out of the multi-state
nature of our Union.... To the extent that the need for a federal forum to
handle these multi-state cases is great enough, such incursion must of course
be accepted. The problem thus becomes one of balance, and ofjudgments
that can perhaps be better made in somewhat more specific contexts.
Id. at 378-79.
3 SeeJudith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Pow-
ers and the Term of the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575, 1603-04
(2006).
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In sum, during the 1960s and into the 1970s, Congress, the courts,
and the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shared a vi-
sion for the federal courts as instruments of policy. The policies em-
bodied substantive commitments to increasing the rights of racial mi-
norities, to responding to some of the inequalities predicated on
gender, and to equipping consumers with mechanisms to enforce fair
practices in commerce. Set forth through constitutional interpreta-
tion and statutes, one of the mechanisms for implementation was the
ability of litigants to bring class actions in federal courts. The "federal-
ism" story that grows out of the 1960s is one celebratory of federal ju-
dicial power, even (and sometimes particularly) if aimed at malfea-
sance by state officials.
On some metrics, that vision "succeeded." Between the 1960s and
the 1990s, Congress enacted legislation creating more than 400 new
federal causes of action. By looking at the "marketplace" for rights en-
forcement and watching filing rates, one can see that many litigants
(or more accurately, their lawyers) chose the federal forum; the fed-
eral court caseload tripled during that period. Understandings of the
possible meanings of the word "case" changed-such that tens of
thousands of people are now understood as somehow together (indi-
vidually aggregated or, as David Shapiro instructs, as an "entity"54) in
something called a "litigation" that can result on occasion in institu-
tional reform or in millions of dollars distributed to thousands of indi-
viduals as compensation for injuries.
IV. BEMOANING ADJUDICATION'S OPPORTUNITIES:
CAFA AND ITS COHORT
Turn now to the contemporary era to place CAFA's normative
predicates into context. As in the 1960s, Congress, the federal rule-
makers, and the Supreme Court are more or less on the same page,
but it is a different one. Today's national lawmakers are skeptical
about the utility of litigation and leery of enabling lawsuits, especially
those with the power of collective actions. Once again, federalization
is the answer. 5
54 David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 913, 917 (1998).
55 See Purcell, supra note 2, at 1856-60.
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A. CAFA's Attitudes Toward Federalism
Like the 1960s class action reforms, CAFA has goals vis-a!-vis con-
sumers, civil rights plaintiffs, and the federal courts. In CAFA, Con-
gress stated three purposes: litigant protection (to "assure fair and
prompt recoveries for class members with legitimate claims"56); utilitar-
ian welfare maximization (to "benefit society by encouraging innova-
tion and lowering consumer prices",7); and reassertion of national sov-
ereign authority (to "restore the intent of the framers of the United
States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of in-
terstate cases of national importance under diversityjurisdiction" 8).
What is the content of CAFA's vision of federalism? First, CAFA
seeks to redefine what is considered a "state case" and a "federal case"
by adding a description that another category exists: cases of "na-
tional importance" that arise from state-based causes of action and
that affect the national economy. CAFA's explication of the problem
of class actions in state courts is that such litigation undermines the
integrity of the "national judicial system, the free flow of interstate
commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction" because state and
local courts were "keeping cases of national importance out of Federal
court." 59 According to this view, state and local courts were biased
against sets of defendants, making judgments that imposed their view
of the law on other states, and binding the rights of the residents of
other states.6O
Does Congress have the constitutional authority to enact CAFA?
Parallel questions were asked eight years ago in the context of the
constitutionality of congressional creation of what it termed the "Civil
Rights Remedy" within the Violence Against Women Act. 61 Oppo-
nents argued that Congress had no authority, under either the Com-
merce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, to enact a provision au-
thorizing private damage actions in federal courts by victims of
violence animated by gender bias.
56 CAFA§ 2(b)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005).
57 Id. § 2(b)(3).
58 Id. § 2(b) (2).
I59 d. § 2(a) (4)-(a)(4) (A).
O See id. § 2(a) (4) (A)-(C).
61 See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat.
1902, 1941 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000)), invalidated lb, United States v. Morri-
son, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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In response, about one hundred law professors (myself included)
and thirty-six state attorneys general took an approach akin to an un-
derstanding of congressional power exemplified by CAFA. We argued
in amici filings in the United States Supreme Court that Congress
could create a federal cause of action about a problem-violence
against women-that both affects the national economy and is a form
62of discrimination against women. We lost in United States v. Morrison,
as a five-person majority held that, because the Constitution required
a distinction between that which was "truly local" and "truly national"
and because, in the majority's view, such violence fell within the cate-
gory of "local," the remedy was beyond congressional power to enact.6
As I argued in that context and elsewhere, efforts to denote prob-
lems as exclusively belonging to one level of government are mistaken,
for many are both "national" and "local.,6 4 Congress has the constitu-
tional power through an interaction between the Commerce Clause
and the Bill of Rights to identify such problems and to respond through
forms of regulation. However, unlike some, I do not believe that what
falls within the categories of the "local" and the "national" is fixed,
predicated on some essentialist understanding of a particular category
(such as "the family" or "criminal law"), or necessarily enduring. Fur-
ther, because one sector has historically been perceived to have domin-
ion over certain issues does not require that authority to continue in the
future. 65 Rather, the content of that which is understood to be within
the purview of "state," "federal," and "national" governments is ever-
changing,6 6 as "state" and "federal" interests are not fixed sets but inter-
active and interdependent conceptions that vary over time. Moreover,
many cases should be understood as both "state" and "federal" in the
sense that they raise legal issues that span the jurisdictional divide.
The language of federal jurisdictional law-describing cases as having
62 See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (No. 99-5), 1999 WE 1032805.
63 See529 U.S. at 617-18.
G4 See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111
YALE L.J. 619, 629-70 (2001) [hereinafter Resnik, CategoricalFederalism].
65 But see Kenneth W. Starr, Preface to FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NA-
TIONAL INTEREsTs, at xi, xiv (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) [here-
inafter FEDERAL PREEMPTION]. There, Dean Starr commented, "Crime eradication,
poverty relief, family governance, morals regulation, together with primary and secon-
dary education, have in the past formed the core responsibilities of state and local gov-
ernment, and they should continue to do so today." Id.
See Resnik, Categorical Federalism, supra note 64, at 619-26; see a/soJudith Resnik,
Afterword: Federalism's Options, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 465, 479-85 (1996) [hereinafter
Resnik, Federalism's Options].
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"federal ingredients" or involving "supplemental" state claims-
captures the many instances in which state and federal laws overlap,
often operating together through a layered regulatory regime. 7
But in CAFA, Congress reined in litigants' ability to select among
jurisdictions with overlapping competencies by enlarging the set of
cases qualifying for diversity jurisdiction. As a result, more cases arising
under state law can and must be litigated in federal court. Unlike Rule
23 (which was not overtly friendly to state-based claims), and unlike the
Supreme Court (which had developed doctrinal interpretations making
it difficult to bring diversity class actions into federal courts66 ), Congress
has taken cases that were formerly conceived as "state" cases, recatego-
rized them as "national," and then assumed that, if national, they are
properly within federal jurisdiction and control.
Above, I pointed out that congressional powers under the Com-
merce Clause support CAFA. Another constitutional hook is Article
III's provisions for diversity litigation. My view-shared by others-is
that Congress has the authority under Article III to create minimal di-
versity requirements. Less widely shared is my view that Erie was
wrongly decided as a matter of constitutional law and that the consti-
tutional grant of federal judicial authority over cases in which citizens
are diverse can (like the federal question clause in Article III) be a
grant for federal common law lawmaking.
Indeed, I view Erie itself as an example of federal common law
lawmaking, a doctrine of discretion akin to many others. Thus, I also
interpret applications of the independent and adequate state law
ground doctrine of Murdock v. Memphis6 9 to be exercises of discretion.
Erie and Murdock work in tandem, one at the trial level and the other
at the Supreme Court level, to recognize and hence to help shape the
identity, integrity, and autonomy of state law. Although not constitu-
tionally required, the precept of Erie-that federal judges ought to de-
fer to state officials when interpreting substantive rules of liability in
cases raising state-based rights-is a useful prudential accommodation
that supports state authority. As the parameters of that practice are
67 One illustration is the recent decision in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Da-
rue Engineering & Manufacturing, stating the rule that "in certain cases federal-question
jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims that implicate significant federal issues." 545
U.S. 308, 312 (2005).
M See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
69 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
70 Thus, Professor Sherry and I agree that Erie is optional but may disagree about
the wisdom of exercising that option. See Sherry, supra note 18, at 2139-40.
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artifacts of federal common law, however, Congress has the power to
alter them, again with the caveat that it may be unwise to do so as a
general matter.
More of CAFA's views on federalism can be understood by con-
sidering what is excluded under CAFA in relation to the states.
Whereas Rule 23 authorized civil rights plaintiffs to seek injunctions
against state actors, CAFA specifically exempts from its aegis cases in
which "the primary defendants are States, State officials, or other
governmental entities against whom the district court may be fore-
closed from ordering relief.",7' CAFA is thus consistent with the Elev-
enth Amendment jurisprudence of the last decade, in which the
Court has also insulated states from certain forms of congressional
and judicial oversight. Further, CAFA is in sync with Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman, in which the Court held (in a five-to-
four decision with opinions marking a bitter divide) that state liti-
gants seeking remedies against the state under state law could find no
relief in federal court.7 1 CAFA's constraints on access for certain
kinds of cases also coheres with the Prison Litigation Reform Act, lim-
iting prisoner access to federal courts and imposing limits on the du-
ration of consent decrees.
73
Another reflection of congressional solicitude to state-elected or
state-appointed officials is CAFA's provision requiring that state attor-
neys general or other state regulatory officials (as well as relevant fed-
eral officials) be notified about settlements. CAFA precludes federal
judges from approving settlements until ninety days after service on
the appropriate regulatory authority in the state in which a class
S 74
member resides. CAFA thus empowers state actors to participate in
71 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (5) (A) (Supp. V 2005). Also excluded are cases involving
proposed classes of one hundred or fewer members. Id. § 1332(d) (5) (B).
72 465 U.S. 89, 117 (1984) (5-4 decision).
73 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat.
1321, 1321-66 (1996).
74 CAFA requires that,
Not later than 10 days after a proposed settlement of a class action is filed in
court, each defendant that is participating in the proposed settlement shall serve
upon the appropriate State official of each State in which a class member resides
and the appropriate Federal official, a notice of the proposed settlement.
CAFA § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b).
"Notice" must consist of a copy of the complaint and related materials, notice of
any scheduled judicial hearing, any proposed or final notification to class members,
any proposed or final class action settlement, any settlement or other agreement made
between class counsel and defense counsel, any final judgment or notice of dismissal,
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settlement negotiations and may-by having claims brought to their• 75
attention-also prompt state officials to file their own lawsuits." Fur-
thermore, CAFA attends to state officials in their role as plaintiffs as
well as potential defendants and participatory commentators. CAFA
excludes from the category of "mass actions" that can be removed to
federal court those cases in which "all of the claims in the action are
asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of indi-
vidual claimants or members of a purported class) pursuant to a State
statute specifically authorizing such action. 76
B. CAFA 's Context: Bell Atlantic, Mandatory Arbitration, and Preemption
Other statutes and doctrinal developments share many of CAFA's
approaches to federalism, the utility of litigation, and the role of the
federal courts. CAFA's predicate goal of constraining "abusive litiga-
tion" 7 is not, according to either the Congress or the courts, limited
to class actions. That attitude was vividly evident in the 2007 U.S. Su-
preme Court decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, which may
have brought about a major change in the law of pleading.
Justice Souter wrote on behalf of a majority of seven about the
misuses of class action litigation in the context of antitrust. One way
to read the decision is that the Court has taken it upon itself to import
features of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act79 into antitrust
law by imposing comparably exacting standards for complaints alleg-
ing restraints on trade and monopolistic practices. Another reading is
that the case, with its negative references to the 1957 decision of
Conley v. Gibson"" (which had stated a liberal pleading rule), is that the
and-depending on feasibility-the names of class members who reside in each State
and their estimated share of the settlement. Id. § 1715(b) (1)-(7).
75 See Rubenstein, supra note 25 (manuscript at 26-27) (suggesting that drafters in
Congress may not have focused on the degree to which CAFA's settlement notice pro-
vision provides opportunities for state officials to receive notice of, and therefore po-
tentially to affect, the settlements of class actions).
76 CAFA§ 4,28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (11)(B) (iii) (111).
77 See generally Elizabeth C. Butrch, CAFA's Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29
CARDOZO L. REv. (forthcoming 2008); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the
Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 103 (2006).
78 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
79 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
§ 21D(b) (1)-(3), 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (1)-(3) (2000)).
80 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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Court aimed to impose new and higher requirements,"' broadening
the movement toward fact pleading in all cases. 2 The decision's
charge to judges-to assess the "plausibility" of pleadings-is a poten-
tially open-ended charter.
Bell Atlantic is one of several developments expanding the discre-
tionary powers of district court judges, although exactly how has al-
ready proved to be perplexing. By searching LexisNexis from May 21,
2007 (the date of Bell Atlantic), through October 31, 2007, one learns
that within its first five months, the decision inspired about 2200 cita-
tions 83 as lower court judges puzzled over how to square it with Erick-
son v. Pardus,84 decided a few weeks thereafter. Erickson declined to
permit the dismissal of a complaint filed by a pro se litigant and ar-
guably applied a test of complaints that is inconsistent with that of Bell
Atlantic.
s
1
5
The ruling in Bell Atlantic has special relevance to CAFA because
86of the Court's critical discussion of Conley v. Gibson. When filed in
the 1950s, the complaint in Conley styled itself a class action, as "Ne-
gro" members of a local branch of a union for railroad workers ob-
81 The majority commented,
We could go on, but there is no need to pile up further citations to show that
Conley's "no set of facts" language has been questioned, criticized, and ex-
plained away long enough. To be fair to the Conley Court, the passage should
be understood in light of the opinion's preceding summary of the complaint's
concrete allegations, which the Court quite reasonably understood as amply
stating a claim for relief. But the passage so often quoted fails to mention this
understanding on the part of the Court, and after puzzling the profession for
50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement. The phrase is best
forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard:
once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any
set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.
Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1969.
82 See generally Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules
of CivilProcedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986).
83 As of that date, the Supreme Court had cited Bell Atlantic twice-in Erickson v.
Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), and in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing,
127 S. Ct. 2383, 2398 (2007). State courts provided fifteen citations, and 2169 came
from the lower federal courts.
84 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007).
85 The Court concluded that the pro se pleader's allegations that his medication was
withheld, that he was still in need of treatment, and that the prison official refused to
provide treatment sufficed under Rule 8(a) (2). Id. at 2200. For discussion of whether
Bell Atlantic and Erickson cohere, see lqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155-59 (2d Cir. 2007),
cert. granted, No. 07-1015, 2008 WL 336310 (June 16, 2008).
86 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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jected that the union had discriminated against them. 7 That group of
plaintiffs made their way into federal court based on liberal rules of
pleading and a refusal by the Court to insist on the joinder of the rail-
road, which would have divested the federal courts of jurisdiction.
8
In contrast, the door-closing attitude expressed by the Bell Atlantic ma-
jority aligns with stated concerns of some of CAFA's supporters, who
saw that legislation as a corrective to overreliance on courts.
CAFA's intent to cut back on class actions-and thereby to limit
the way in which aggregate litigation can be used to respond to the
economic barriers to litigation that I raised at the outset-should also
be put in the context of the lack of congressional interest in finding
other ways to subsidize litigation. As in the 1960s, when Rule 23 was in
sync with the creation of the Legal Services Corporation, CAFA co-
heres with the 1996 restrictions on LSC lawyers and congressional
prohibitions on LSC-funded lawyers bringing class actions."8 Just as
Rule 23 once worked with the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976, CAFA mirrors the narrowing of the reach of that Act. Con-
gress has also cut back by statute on fee awards for attorneys represent-
ing prisoners.9° Further, when interpreting fee-shifting statutes in civil
87 Id. at 42-43.
88 Id. at 44-45.
89 See 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2007) ("Recipients [of LSC funding] are prohibited from
initiating or participating in any class action."). The Court has, however, rejected the
view that state funding of legal services through Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account
(IOLTA) funds violated attorneys' rights. See Brown v. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216,
231-35 (2003).
go Specifically, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 enacted the following re-
strictions with regard to attorneys' fees:
(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility ... [attorneys'] fees shall not be awarded, except to
the extent that-
(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual viola-
tion of the plaintiff's rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee
may be awarded under section 2 of the Revised Statutes; and
(B) (i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court or-
dered relief for the violation; or
(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief
ordered for the violation.
(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in
paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be
applied to satisfy' the amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant.
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rights cases, the Supreme Court has narrowly defined when a party
"prevails"9' and has reduced fee awards by prohibiting judges from
adding "multipliers" to reflect the risk entailed in bringing cases in
which fees are contingent on success.92
More generally, CAFA reflects and contributes to the view that law-
suits often generate more costs than benefits. Hence, it is also in line
with developments in the federal law of arbitration, where the Court
has elaborated a muscular interpretation of the 1925 Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA). In some respects, federal arbitration law-divesting
state courts of jurisdiction in a variety of ways and federalizing the law
of contract to some extent-can be understood as a forerunner of
CAFA. One example is the lawsuit by St. Clair Adams against Circuit
City, in which the plaintiff claimed a violation of California's prohibi-
tions on discrimination based on sexual orientation. 93 The Court in-
terpreted the 1925 FAA to apply to employee contracts other than
those excluded by the text of the statute and held that mandatory
agreements to arbitrate are enforceable.94 State courts lostjurisdiction.
Arbitration law "fits" CAFA in another respect, in that many man-
datory provisions for arbitration also preclude class action or aggrega-
tion in arbitration. In 2006, in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 95
the Supreme Court further divested state courts of authority. The
Court overturned the Florida Supreme Court and held that arbitra-
tors, not state judges, were to decide in the first instance interpretative
questions about arbitration provisions and severability. '( Further-
more, just as federal judges are overseeing the decision of state court
judges on arbitration, the development of law using due process to
If the award of attorney's fees is not greater than 150 percent of thejudgment,
the excess shall be paid by the defendant.
(3) No award of attorney's fees in an action described in paragraph (1) shall
be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate estab-
lished under section 3006A of title 18, United States Code, for payment of
court-appointed counsel.
Pub. L. No. 104-134, sec. 803(d), § 7(d), 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-71 to 72 (1996) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2000)).
91 See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Hu-
man Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
92 See, e.g., City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 567 (1992).
93 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 110 (2001).
94 Id. at 119.
95 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
96 Id. at 446.
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control awards of punitive damages also gives federal judges the op-• • 97
portunity to oversee statejudges in their relationship tojuries.
The displacement of state law exemplified by the interpretation of
the FAA occurs through preemption, which is the next doctrinal cate-
gory to add (as Samuel Issacharoff and Catherine Sharkey have not-
ed"") to the stack of CAFA-like lawmaking. Preemption is a particu-
larly powerful tool of federalization, for it directly overrides state
substantive rules of law; complete preemption generates both federal
substantive law and federal court jurisdiction. This growth in preemp-
tion law has now caught the attention of the academy, as can be seen
in the spurt of law review articles and in a recent compendium on the
topic edited by Richard Epstein and Michael Greve. 99'
As this body of materials shows, the presumption against preemp-
tion is waning along with the presumption of the concurrency of state
and federal regulation. '°0 The Supreme Court has relied on federal
preemption in a variety of contexts, including to override both local
and state legislation on transnational human rights. Two of the major
recent decisions are Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, challenging
Massachusetts's efforts to ban state taxpayers' funds going to goods
made with forced labor,'l ' and American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi,
contesting California's efforts to insist that insurers within the state dis-
close Holocaust-related activities. 1 In both instances, the Supreme
Court rendered expansive understandings of its own doctrine of for-
eign affairs preemption to preclude state-based decisions. Similarly, in
a case on the use of medical marijuana, Gonzales v. Raich, the Court
concluded that state judgments on the health and welfare of their resi-
103
dents had to cede to federal executive enforcement prerogatives.
97 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063-65 (2007).
98 See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 13, at 1365-98.
99 See FEDERAl. PREEMPTION, sup/ra note 65; see also Richard H. Fallon,Jr., The "Con-
servative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CII. L. REV. 429, 471-72
(2002); lssacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 13, at 1433 app. (listing Supreme Court cases
involving preemption).
too See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007) (finding that federal
banking law preempts certain state-level regulation); Geier v. An. Honda Motor Co.,
529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding that federal law preempts a state common law tort action).
Displaced is what PRice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) posited: an "as-
sumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
101 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
102 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
103 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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The Court's embrace of preemption is shared by many members of
Congress, but before turning to recent legislative examples, a historical
baseline is in order. According to Stephen Gardbaum, in the "sixteen
major federal statutes from the Sherman Act of 1890 to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938," not "a single statute contains an express provi-
sion clearly preempting the states. Only one pre-New-Deal statute, the
Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, contains explicit preemption language,
and this is an explicit nonpreemption provision." 0 4 Moreover, "at least
four major pieces of New Deal legislation contain express nonpreemp-
tion provisions of various types,"-the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the Social Security Act of 1935,
and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938-all in an effort to enable
"cooperative federalism." 105
In contrast, according to a 2006 congressional monograph,
"[o]ver the last five years, the House and the Senate have passed 73
separate preemption provisions, and 39 of these have become law."'0'0
This report, Congressional Preemption of State Laws and Regulations, was
prepared at the behest of Representative Henry Waxman, a Democrat
from California concerned about the trend towards preemption. Pro-
posed congressional overrides of state law described by the report
span a gamut of activities including some associated with what many
claim to be core "state" arenas, such as measures related to health,
welfare, and family life.'0 7 And, like CAFA's invocation of "fairness,"
some of these provisions also have appealing titles. One provision, the
"Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users," preempts more than a dozen state laws (including
those of New York, Florida, and California) that had imposed vicari-
ous liability on car-rental agencies for injuries imposed by uninsured
drivers.'08  Another, the "Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms
104 Stephen Gardbaum, The Breadth vs. the Depth of Congress's Commerce Power: The
Curious Histoiy of Preemption During the Lochner Era, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note
65, at 48, 73.
105 Id. at 73-74.
106 MINORITY STAFF, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIv., H. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM,
109TH CONG., CONGRESSIONAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS I
(Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL PREEMPTION], available at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20060606095331-23055.pdf.
107 Examples of legislation from the report include proposals to preempt state laws
on reproduction, abortion, and end-of-life care. Id. at 2.
'08 Pub. L. No. 109-59, sec. 10208, § 30106, 119 Stat. 1144, 1935-36 (2005) (codi-
fied at 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (Supp. V 2005)). Some sixteen states imposed liability on
rental-car companies when an uninsured driver of a rental car caused harm. CON-
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Act," now precludes states and localities from imposing civil liabilities
on gun manufacturers.'°°
While many bills propose to preempt judgments made at the state
level, Congress has recently enacted a provision that recognizes the
legitimacy of localjudgments. At the end of 2007, Congress acknowl-
edged that, under specified circumstances including the provision of
notice, state and local governments had the authority to divest certain
investments from Sudan." ° In a signing statement, however, President
Bush insisted that, while the act "purports to authorize" such divest-
ure, "the Constitution vests the exclusive authority to conduct foreign
relations with the Federal Government," and therefore "the executive
branch shall construe and enforce this legislation in a manner that
does not conflict with that authority.""'.
GRESSIONAL PREEMPTION, supra note 106, at 19; see, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 17150 (West
2000) ("Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to
person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the op-
eration of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person
using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.");
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 388(1) (McKinney 2005) ("Every owner of a vehicle used or
operated in this state shall be liable and responsible for death or injtries to person or
property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the
business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with
the permission . . . of such owner."). Congress instead prohibited owners of vehicles
from being held "liable tinder the law of any State" for accidents, if a car was rented
and the owner not negligent. 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (Supp. V 2005). A federal district
court judge in Florida has twice held this particular preemption to be an unconstitu-
tional exercise of Commerce Clause powers. See Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v.
Drouin, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1350-51 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (Moore,].); Vanguard Car
Rental USA v. Huchon, No. 06-10082, 2007 WL 2875388, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 14,
2007) (Moore, J.). A Florida state court disagreed, asserting that "motor vehicle leas-
ing transactions unquestionably affect the channels of interstate commerce, the in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce, and intrastate activities substantially related to
interstate commerce." Bechina v. Enter. Leasing Co., No. 3D07-1225, 2007 WI.
4322303, at *1 (Fla. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2007).
109 Pub. L. No. 109-92, §§ 3-4, 119 Stat. 2095, 2096-99 (2005) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 7902-7903 (2006)). Other proposed preemption provisions have not yet
passed both the House and the Senate. For example, one proposal would strip federal
and state courts of jurisdiction over state tort remedies related to obesity. See Personal
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. §§ 3(a), 4(5)
(2005). Another would preempt certain state civil actions for employing spyware while
creating federal penalties. See Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2005, H.R.
744, 109th Cong., sec. 2, § 1030A(c) (2005).
"o See Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, § 3,
121 Stat. 2516, 2518-19 (Dec. 31, 2007).
In See Statement on Signing the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007,
43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1646 (Dec. 1, 2007). The President also stated that he
shared "the deep concern of the Congress over the continued violence in Darfur per-
petrated by the Government of Sudan and rebel groups." Id. He asserted that his ad-
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His views on federalization are shared by others, some writing spe-
cifically about "foreign affairs preemption" and others more generally
interested in national authority. Just as the class action reforms of the
1960s were supported by sectors within the academic community, the
"new" preemption doctrine has received a warm reception by some
members of the bench, bar, and legal academia. As Kenneth Starr
explained that position in his preface to a recent volume devoted to
preemption, the doctrine's expansion is justified because we "need
judges and justices who intuitively understand the importance of pro-
tecting our vast commercial republic and who are willing to use the
historic role of the federal judiciary to that end."".2
In sum, this review of the work from the 1960s to the first part of
the twenty-first century reveals that federalization has been a device
used repeatedly to implement policies formed at the national level.
The underlying national norms change, but the method does not.
V. THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS OF AGGREGAT1VE TRANSLOCALISM
Identifying the structural continuity linking Rule 23 and CAFA
should not obscure significant changes in the landscape of federalism
over the decades that lie between them. Cases-as in the diversity
cases that CAFA puts into federal court-are not the only artifacts of
states that have been nationalizing, and Congress has not been the
only engine of nationalization. State and local officials are "going na-
tional" too as they work in institutions that crisscross state as well as
national boundaries.
A. Neither Separate Spheres nor Solo Actors
In many discussions of federalism, states are posited as singular ac-
tors, sometimes in competition with one another but rarely described
as acting in concert. Similarly, categories of activity are presumed to
belong, almost naturally, either to state or to federal governance.
CAFA is one example of many breaches of this ideology of separate
spheres, in that CAFA takes so-called "state" cases and turns them into
ministration would "continue its efforts to bring about significant improvements in the
conditions in Sudan through sanctions against the Government of Sudan and high
level diplomatic engagement and by supporting the deployment of peacekeepers in
Darfur." Id.
112 Starr, supra note 65, at xv.
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"federal" ones." 3 Such flip-flops (state-federal or federal-state) can be
seen in other arenas as well. While education and marriage were once
specially identified as within state prerogatives, national actions (e.g.,
the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001114 and the Defense of Marriage
Act"') have intervened. Moreover, the direction of change is not only
toward federal authority. Through "devolution," what were once na-
tionally regulated income supports"
6 and speed limits on highways"
7
have become areas claimed to be better suited to state governance.
In addition to watching subject matters reassigned from the states
to the national government or from federal to state governments, one
can also find many examples of overstatements about exclusivity of
control by either state or the federal government. Layers of authority,
some state and some federal, can be seen from family life to foreign
relations. Constitutional law sets some of the parameters of permissi-
ble state regulation of the qualifications for marriage, as the (aptly
named) Loving v. Virginia"" made plain. Federal bankruptcy and pen-
113 As Purcell explains,
[F]or the previous thirty years Congress-and the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts-had firmly believed that those very same state-law class actions prop-
erly 'belonged' in the state courts, not the federal courts. CAFA's supporters,
then, could not have chosen to send class actions to the federal courts simply
because those cases 'belong' there. Rather, they had to have had some addi-
tional reason for acting, a reason of practical policy and anticipated conse-
quences. That reason, the evidence suggests, was their belief that CAFA would
terminate large numbers of class actions and prevent many more from ever
being filed.
Purcell, supra note 2, at 1868-69.
114 Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1001, 115 Stat. 1425, 1439 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C.
6301 (Supp. V 2005)) (establishing federal standards for public schools to "ensure that
all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality edt-
cation and reach, at minimum, proficiency on ... State academic achievement stan-
dards and state academic assessments").
It, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419, §§ 2-3 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7
(2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)) (defining "marriage" under federal law as "only
a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife" and permitting
states to refuse to recognize same-sex relationships that are treated as marriages under
another state's laws).
116 See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, sec. 103, § 401, 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 601 (a) (2000)) (increasing the "flexibility of States in operating" programs designed
to aid needy families and encourage work and marriage).
117 See, e.g., National Highway System Designation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-59,
§ 205(d), 109 Stat. 568, 577 (repealing the national maximum speed limit).
118 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (declaring state antimiscegenation laws unconstitu-
tional).
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sion laws allocate property rights in and by marital units; federal law
creates and enforces interfamily support obligations.11 9 Indeed, in
some divorces, the largest assets to be divided are ruled by a regime of
federally protected pension rights. Thus, both constitutional and
statutory provisions shape a significant body of "federal laws of the
family" affecting interpersonal relations 2  Moving to "foreign" rela-
tions or international law, the state-federal interaction is similarly
dense with examples ranging from state obligations to provide consu-
lar notice when detaining non-national criminal defendants to state
laws divesting assets from the Sudan and affiliating with other coun-
tries in efforts to curb global warming. 1
The actual autonomy-of states to each other or to the nation,
and of the nation to the world-is likewise overstated. Some facets of
joint venturing are long-standing, recognized in the Constitution
through authorization for states to join together in compacts sanc-
tioned by Congress. 112 Twentieth-century examples include the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority and the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey. Further, under the aegis of the Uniform Commission on State
Laws, states have "independently" adopted parallel statutes addressing
issues ranging from the Uniform Code of Commercial Law to the in-
terstate transfer of detainees. 113 In addition, many federal laws rely on
state implementation, prompting political scientists to use the meta-
phors of "marble cake," "picket fences," and "matrices" to capture the
interdependencies of local, state, and national governance.124
119 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2000).
120 See Resnik, Categorical Federalism, supra note 64, at 644-56; Judith Resnik, "Natu-
rally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682,
1721-29 (1991) (analyzing the ways in which family relations "can be described as a re-
gime ofjoint [state and federal] governance").
121 See, e.g Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008);Judith Resnik, Foreign as Do-
mestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of
Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORy L.J. 31 (2007).
122 See U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 10, cl. 3 (the "Compact Clause") ("No State shall, with-
out the Consent of Congress, ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power .. "). For a general discussion of the Compact Clause
and the use of interstate compacts, see, for example, Felix Frankfurter & James M.
Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE
L.J. 685 (1925); Jill E. Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem, of
Permanency, 49 FLA. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1997).
123 See, e.g., Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538, 84 Stat.
1397 (1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. at 1520 (2000).
124 The classic analysis is DANIELJ. ELAzAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM (1987).
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But even those terms no longer suffice, as technology and global-
ization further interrupt a tidy narrative of federalism. Forms of juris-
diction-bending are everywhere, as subnational and transnational col-
lectives defy conventional federalism's assumptions. Responding to
their citizenry's concerns, local officials regularly cross state and na-
tional borders to deal with problems involving the production of toys
and drugs, toxic spills, and crimes that respect no geographical lines.
A few specifics about the organizations that now exist and the work
that they do are in order. Over the course of the last century, state and
local officials built transjurisdictional networks such as the National
League of Cities, the United States Conference of Mayors, the National
Conference of State Legislatures, the National Governors Association,
and the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 125
In many respects, these organizations are themselves artifacts of
federalism. Most were formed during the twentieth century as gov-
ernment-based "interest groups" intended to protect localities from
what they viewed as national encroachments on their prerogatives and
to forward municipal agendas in their own states as well as in Wash-
ington. With the nationalization and globalization of the economy,
they have broadened their horizons and are forging links to other
subnational entities around the world in a manner that one scholar
described as beyond the ability of the national government "to con-
trol, supervise, or even monitor."
1
2
6
In the language of social movement theory, these "norm entre-
preneurs" are using their institutional voices to shape policies as they
define the parameters of their own concerns. But unlike the classic
NGOs in the literature, these groups of public officials in private or-
ganizations sit between the public and private sectors. They are nei-
ther fully nongovernmental nor fully governmental organizations, as
they get their clout and resources as a result of their roles as officials
in the public sphere. Hence, another term-I suggest "translocal or-
ganizations of government actors," or TOGAs-is needed to capture
their distinctive properties.
125 For in-depth descriptions of these organizations and their import for federal-
ism, see Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin &Joseph Frueh, Don't Sign Kyoto; Don't Cite Foreign
Law: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs),
50 ARIz. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008); Joshua Civin, Public Official Associations: Legal
Federalism in Theory and Practice 6-11 (Dec. 3, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
126 EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOcAL GOvERNMENTS IN U.S.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 128 (1998).
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In terms of their import, as those supportive of state authority
have long insisted, states and localities have been and continue to be
important sites of social change; TOGAS enable more such coordi-
nated action. At the national level, many examples of their impact on
policy can be found. The federal statute on nuclear waste that the
Supreme Court struck down on Tenth Amendment grounds in New
York v. United States,127 for example, was proposed by the National Gov-
ernors Association. Local policy efforts have also recast national
agendas through the work begun by a dozen or so mayors who, in
2005, crafted a joint statement on climate control. 128 As of April 2008,
that statement has been adopted by more than 800 mayors represent-
ing close to 80 million Americans.
As with other interest groups, state-based interest groups do not
always succeed in persuading national lawmakers to adopt their points
of view. Two of the recent preemption statutes that I mentioned-the
legislation to exempt car rental companies from liability for car acci-
dents by uninsured renters 1  and the legislation to exempt gun manu-
facturers from liability 1 3 1-are illustrative. The first was opposed by
the National Conference of State Legislatures3 2 and the second by the
United States Conference of Mayors. 133
CAFA itself is a mixed example in that the legislation was not de-
railed even though it was opposed by the Conference of Chief Justices
of the State Courts, 131 the National Conference of State Legislatures,
127 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
128 See U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, Mayors Climate
Protection Center, http://usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 15, 2008).
123 List of Participating Mayors, Mayors Climate Protection Center, http://
usmayors.org/climateprotection/list.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2008).
130 See supra note 108.
131 See supra note 109.
132 See CONGRESSIONAL PREEMPTION, supra note 106, at 19 & n.70 (citing Letter
from Michael Balboni, Chair, Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures Comm. on Law
and Criminal Justice, to Senator Bill Frist, Senate Majority Leader, and Senator Harry
Reid, Senate Minority Leader (Apr. 26, 2005)).
133 See Ed Somers, Gun Immunity Considered by Congress, U.S. MAYOR NEWSPAPER,
May 9, 2005, http://wwv.usmayors.org/uscm/us-mayornewspaper/documents/05_
09_- 05/guns.asp.
13 See Letter from Annice M. Wagner, President, Conference of Chief Justices, to
Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 28, 2002),
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/CCJLetter.pdf (arguing that "[a]bsent
hard evidence of the inability of the state judicial systems to hear and decide fairly class
actions brought in state courts," CAFA was not warranted). This letter was invoked in
the February 28, 2005, Statement of Minority Views by Senators Leahy, Kennedy, Bi-
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and by a collective of more than a dozen state attorneys general who
objected that the act "unduly limits the right of individuals to seek re-
dress for corporate wrongdoing in their state courts." 136 In addition to
that subgroup, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG)
had sought to have CAFA specify flatly that the statute would not apply
to "any civil action brought by, or on behalf of, any attorney general."''
1 7
Yet Congress was responsive to the collective concerns of the states
and provided a measure of protection for state actors both as plaintiffs
and as defendants. Although Congress did not adopt the NAAG pro-
posal verbatim, it did exempt from federalization any case filed "on
behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of individual claim-
ants or members of a purported class) pursuant to a State statute spe-
cifically authorizing such action."'' 13  Furthermore, CAFA insulates
state actors as defendants; cases in which "the primary defendants are
States, State officials, or other governmental entities against which the
district court may be foreclosed from ordering relief" cannot be re-
moved from state to federal court.139
In addition, as noted earlier, CAFA gives new opportunities to
state attorneys general to participate in class actions by mandating that
public officials be notified of proposed agreements before settlements
can be approved.14 Those officials can therefore affect both processes
den, Feingold, and Durbin in opposition to CAFA. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 82 n.2
(2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 75.
135 See Letter from Michael Balboni, Chair, Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures
Law and Criminal Justice Comm., to U.S. Senate (Feb. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NCSLClassActionLetter2-05.pdf (asserting that
CAFA "undermines our system of federalism, disrespects our state court system, and
clearly preempts carefully crafted state judicial processes ... regarding the treatment
of class action lawsuits").
1 Letter from Eliot Spitzer, N.Y. Att'y Gen., et al., to Senator Bill Frist, Senate Ma-
jority Leader, and Senator Harry Reid, Senate Minority Leader (Feb. 7, 2005) [herein-
after Letter from Fifteen State Attorneys General], reprinted in 151 CONG. REc. H644-45
(daily ed. Feb. 16, 2005). In addition to the New York Attorney General, the letter was
also sent on behalf of the Attorneys General of California, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Vermont, and West Virginia. Id. at H644.
"' See 151 CONG. REc. S1215-16 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Pryor)
(proposing an amendment to the bill).
"" CAFA § 4, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(I)(B)(11)(lI) (Supp. V 2005). The distinction
is not trivial in that specific statutes are needed rather than the inherent power to act
on behalf of the state.
I9 Id. § 1332(d)(5) (A). Also excluded are cases involving proposed classes of
fewer than one hundred members. Id. § 1332(d) (5) (B).
140 See id. § 1715; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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and outcomes in cases.'41 (The fifteen attorneys general who objected
to CAFA had raised the concern that this provision could give a mis-
leading impression that individuals' interests were "being protected by
their government representatives, simply because the notice was sent"
to such officials. 142)
As the mention of a group of only fifteen attorneys general taking
a particularjoint position on CAFA suggests, being a state official does
not necessarily result in sharing views on the allocation of authority
between governments or on substantive policies with other state ac-
tors. Several state-based organizations exist, and they often do not all
align on the same side of an issue. Ready examples come from the re-
cent federal cases on the United States Supreme Court docket, where
amici briefs filed by various actors in state government can be found' 43
on both sides. More unanimity among states comes in the context
of preemption of state law, which they generally oppose. 144
Further, the posture of any given TOGA is not fixed over time but
varies with its leadership's views in response to changing conditions. A
brief review of the last fifty years of the National League of Cities pro-
vides one illustration. During the 1950s, as the Cold War was under-
way, the National League of Cities developed the "sister-cities" pro-
gram aimed at "people-to-people" diplomacy to show the desirability
of America's economic system in the face of socialism and commu-
nism. 14- In the 1970s, the name-National League of Cities-came to
serve as the shorthand in the federal courts' jurisprudence for a Su-
preme Court decision recognizing a locality's (short-lived) Tenth
Amendment exemption from federal regulation of fair labor laws.14"
The National League of Cities was then a champion of local preroga-
tives, in that case to prevent federal regulation of their workers' wages
and hours.
141 See Rubenstein, supra note 25 (manuscript at 5-8).
142 See Letter from Fifteen State Attorneys General, supra note 136, at H645.
143 See, e.g., Civin, supra note 125 (manuscript at 27) (stating that states and gov-
ernment officials signed on to both sides of a dispute over the 1990 census).
144 See, e.g., Brief for the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Petitioner at 1, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007) (No. 05-1342),
2006 WL 2570992, at *1 (arguing on behalf of forty-nine states that federal law ought
not to be interpreted to preclude state regulation of banks operating subsidiaries or-
ganized under state law). The Supreme Court held otherwise. Waiters, 127 U.S. 1559.
145 See Sister Cities International: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.sister-
cities.org/sci/aboutsci/faqs (last visited Apr. 15, 2008).
146 See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
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Yet before pigeonholing the National League of Cities as taking a
particular stance, one must also consider its recent network building,
both locally and globally, including efforts to support an equality
agenda concerned about reducing racism and promoting women as
decision makers in governments around the globe. In 2005, the Na-
tional League of Cities called for "full funding for Violence Against
Women Act programs as well as efforts which support the abolition of
international systematic cultural and state-sanctioned physical, sexual
and psychological human rights abuse and oppression of women
throughout the world."147
Another example of boundary-bending comes from California,
where in October 2007, a new law on "toxic toys" was enacted to pro-
hibit the sale and manufacture of toys and child-care items that con-
tain "phthalates," chemicals believed to harm children's health.148
This law both serves as a model for other states and used as its own
model the regulations of the City of San Francisco that had in turn
borrowed from and been informed by lawmaking in Europe. 49 (Not
surprisingly, given current trends, some have argued that federal law
preempts state rules of this kind. 150 )
147 National League of Cities, Resolution 2007-43: Urging More Effective Emer-
gency Preparedness and Response and Action on Related Issues, available at
http://nlc.org/ (search for "2007-43"; follow "NLC Resolution #2006-40").
148 See Assemb. B. No. 1108, 2007-08 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab 1101-1150/abj 108bill 20071014
chaptered.pdf.
49 See S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 34 (2008); Council Directive 92/59, 1992 O.J.
(L 228) 24 (EEC) (establishing product safety guidelines, including the regulation of
dangerous chemicals). On December 14, 2005, the product safety ban on some dan-
gerous chemicals (including phthalates) became permanent in the European Union.
See Council Directive 2005/84, 2005 OJ. (L 344) 40 (E.C.). These European materials
were cited in the analysis of the California law. See Analysis of Assemb. B. 1108 of the S.
Envtl. Quality Conm., 2007-08 Leg., Reg. Sess. 4-5 (Cal. 2007), available at
http://eginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_1101-1150/ab_1 108 cfa 20070629
163701 sen comm.html.
150 See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Toy Indus. Ass'n v. City and County of S.F., No. 06-7111
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2006) (arguing that the San Francisco's ban "is preempted in part
by the [Federal Hazardous Substances Act]"); Complaint at 1, Citikids Baby News, Inc.
v. City and County of S.F., No. 06-457303 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 2006) (arguing that
San Francisco ordinance banning allegedly dangerous chemicals "is preempted by the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act"); Stipulation and Order Regarding Hearing of
Pending Application for Preliminary Injunction at 2-3, Citikids, No. 06-457303, at 2
(Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 2007) (dismissing Citikids' claims in exchange for nonenforce-
ment of the ordinance); see also jane Kay, Health Officials Ask Supes to Alter 'Toxic Toy'
Measure, S.F. CHRON.,Jan. 8, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 401262 (discussing chemical
and toy manufacturers' claims that San Francisco lacks authority to regulate the use of
certain allegedly toxic chemicals in children's toys). In addition, proposals were made
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B. Safeguards but No Safety
In the mid-1950s, Herbert Wechsler counseled that courts should
generally leave the allocation of power to what he called the "political
safeguards of federalism."' 5' The idea was that, rather than have the
federal judiciary respond when plaintiffs challenged federal legislation
and thereby oversee Congress, state officials-unhappy with what they
perceived to be overreaching by the national government-should
make their arguments in Congress, where they were formally repre-
sented by senators and members of the House. Weschler thought that
state-based officials charged with national governance were better
situated to make judgments about allocation of power between state
and national action.
I borrow Wechsler's phrase "political safeguards" and apply it to
translocal organizations like the National League of Cities, the Con-
ference of Mayors, and the collectives of state attorneys general, gov-
ernors, and state legislators. These organizations are all exemplary of
the multiplication of "national" players rooted in states yet reaching
across them. Fifty years after Wechsler, as we enter a new century of
federalism, the relevant public participants in policy debates extend
beyond the three branches of the national government and the states,
either acting alone or coordinated through Congress. Currents of
laws from abroad have affected U.S. norms before, but the prolifera-
tion of translocal and transnational organizations, coupled with new
technologies and media, have made such dialogues more accessible.
For me, there is solace in knowing that competition exists at the
national level that will enliven debates about what the shape of regula-
tions should be. The underlying issues of how to protect safety and
well-being and how to recognize the liberty, equality, and dignitary in-
terests of individuals are so difficult that having a wide range of view-
points has the potential to increase understandings of the many di-
mensions of each issue.
To be enthusiastic about multiple layers of policymaking on these
issues is not, however, to suggest that positions taken by local collec-
tives or through translocal work should necessarily be celebrated, any
more than one can presume that national regulation is necessarily
wise or that all forms of collective action are generative. On the mer-
at the federal level to preempt state and local efforts if they imposed certain consumer
protections that were more restrictive than federal standards. See, e.g., Stockholm and
Rotterdam Toxics TreatyAct of 2006, H.R. 4591, 109th Cong. § 6(e) (1).
151 Wechsler, supra note 4, at 543.
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its of any particular regulatory stance, initiatives at the local level run
the political gamut, seemingly "right" to some and very "wrong" to
others. One current example of local divergence is the question of
immigration reform, where one can find "sanctuary cities" as well as
communities enacting punitive measures against undocumented indi-
viduals. 152 Similarly, CAFA-like enactments (or more energetic tort re-
form and caps on damages) can be found in some states while other
jurisdictions are more welcoming of tort litigants. 15
3
Putting TOGAs into the discussion of CAFA is appropriate be-
cause they too are aggregates that should be considered through theo-
ries applied in debates over class actions, as concerns have been raised
about the quality of representation by group leaders and how deci-
sions are made for a group. Further, because TOGAs are by definition
entities comprised of public actors, they should also be considered in
light of general democratic concerns about fairness, transparency, and
accountability. Thus, much more needs to be said about what can be
gained and lost with the development of subnational quasipublic or-
ganizations engaged in policymaking.
One cannot, for example, assume that as these configurations
align, a diversity of policies will emerge. Coventuring by state actors
can produce a great deal of overlap across states rather than the vari-
ety of policies presumed through images of experimentation (e.g., the
states as laboratories)-which have been posited to be a desirable as-
pect of federalism. Coordination may work to diminish some of the
perceived utilities of a federated system. Moreover, as Lynn Baker,
Michael Greve, and others have argued as in addressing horizontal
aggrandizement, some state officials may seek to exert undue influ-
ence within such groups, given that not all have equal power, re-
sources, or populations.'5 4 On the other hand, William Rubenstein
has reported that, through participation in class action cases, state at-
torneys general might negotiate better settlements than class counsel
are able or willing to secure' 5' and/or thatjoint and coordinated ven-
152 See, e.g., New Haven, Conn., Dep't of Police Serv., General Order 06-2 (Dec. 21,
2006); Ariz. Contractors Ass'n., Inc., v. Candelaria, No. 07-2496, 2008 WL 343082 (D.
Ariz. Feb. 7, 2008); Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
15: See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV.
1093, 1149-60 (1996).
15 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REv. 951, 961-66 (2001); Michael S. Greve, Cartel Federalism? Anti-
trust Enforcement by State Attor eys General, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 103-08 (2005).
155 See Rubenstein, supra note 25 (manuscript at 14-21) (describing a case in which
the New Jersey Attorney General secured cash payments for state citizens while class
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tures by state officials might serve to monitor the quality of bargains
made by class representatives themselves. 156
VI. FEDERALISM'S OPTIONS, COLLECTIVE NECESSITIES, AND
SOVEREIGNTY-SKEPTICISM
How do these translocal and transnational activities inform
evaluations of CAFA and the kind of federalization that it represents?
First, the twentieth-century invention of many national organizations
of state-based officials teaches that federalization ought not to be the
only response when a problem is understood to be one of "national"
dimensions. A national response can emerge without turning every-
thing into a "federal case." For example, state and federal judges, pre-
sumed to be landlocked, have been involved in practices sometimes
described as 'judicial federalism" that reflect the interdependencies of
federal and state court systems.""57 While CAFA represents the cen-
tralization of jurisdiction in the federal system, we have other exam-
ples in which state and federal judges worked together, sometimes lit-
erally "sitting" alongside each other and issuing separate but
5 8
interrelated (or identical) decisions." '  On the criminal side, the
counsel settled for coupons).
IG Id. (manuscript at 22-31) (describing case in which thirty-six state attorneys
general (or equivalent) objected to a class action settlement and the court did not ap-
prove it).
157 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTs, 166 F.R.D. 49, 81 (1995). While I borrow that term, I use it differently, for
there, 'judicial federalism" is defined to reflect the view that state and federal courts
play "different but equally significant" roles comprising an integrated justice system. Id.
158 Some of this work stemmed from efforts, in the 1980s, when federal and state
judges began to cross jurisdictional lines simply to talk. In 1990, the Conference of
Chief Justices of the State Courts and the Judicial Conference of the United States au-
thorized the creation of a "National Federal-State Judicial Council," resulting in a first-
ever national conference of state and federal judges in 1992. See Malcolm M. Lucas,
Keynote Address: National Conference on State-Federal judicial Relationships, 78 VA. L. REV.
1663 (1992). Along with conversation came joint ventures. Despite the formal statu-
tory and doctrinal statements (that federal and state judicial systems are distinct, with
few mechanisms for interjurisdictional consolidation), federal and state judges in
charge of "All Brooklyn Navy Yard" asbestos cases convened a "state and federal court,"
and their rulings were captioned with each court's name. See, e.g., In reJoint E. & S.
Dists. Asbestos Litig. 737 F. Supp. 735 (E.D.N.Y., S.D.N.Y. & N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990); In re
NewYork City Asbestos Litig., 123 B.R. 7 (E.D.N.Y., S.D.N.Y. & N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990); In re
Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 F.R.D. 434 (E.D.N.Y., S.D.N.Y. & N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1990). In the Exxon Valdez oil-spill litigation, federal and state judges coordinated
scheduling and discovery. See Barnaby J. Feder, Exxon Valdez's Sea of Litigation, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1989, at F1 (noting the "unusual joint sitting of the state and Federal
courts"); see also Resnik, Federalism's Options, supra note 66, at 482 n.82 (describing how
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"cross-designation" of federal and state agents and prosecutors makes
the boundaries between state and federal crime enforcement perme-
able.""..,
By attending to the invention of these relatively new formations,
we can both revise the presumption of dichotomous alternatives (cases
must be either in the state or federal domain) and of essentialized im-
ages (of states and of the federal government). Further, we can con-
sider yet other arrangements that embody the interdependence of
participants within and beyond the United States. For example, one
can explore whether another set of courts-national but not federal-
could be developed to deal with some cases that cross jurisdictions but
are not governed by federal legal rules. 60
Second, the term "horizontal federalism" ought to be broadened
beyond a focus on state-to-state interactions to include the work of
these national but not federal organizations and to consider not only
their regulatory impact but whether they too ought to be subject to
regulation. Once the collective actions of state officials, empowered
through their public persona but engaged in decision making not al-
ways licensed or regulated through public law, come into focus, so do
questions familiar in other aggregate contexts: What kinds of judg-
ments ought these organizations make? Through what internal proc-
esses? What weight should other political institutions give to their
judgments? Should these state-based private organizations be concep-
tualized as agents, principals, or lobbyists acting on behalf of the of-
fices they hold? These questions ought to prompt inquiries both em-
pirical and normative. 161
the state and federal courts "[took] turns as the lead" in the Brooklyn Navy Yard cases
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
159 See Daniel C. Richman, "Project Exile" and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcenent
Authority, 43 ARIZ. L. REv. 369, 370 (2001); see also Daniel C. Richman, The Changing
Boundaries Between F'ederal and Local Enforcement, in 2 CRIMINALJUSTICE 2000: BOUNDARY
CHANGES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS (Nat'l Inst. ofJustice ed., 2000), avail-
able at http://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal-justice2000/vol_2/02d2.pdf.
See Resnik, Federalism's Options, supra note 66, at 476-77.
For example, under the aegis of the National Association of Attorneys General, a
"Multistate Antitrust Task Force" was created, and that organization has "Guidelines" for
the enforcement. See THOMAS GREENE & ROBERT L. HUBBARD, STATE ANTITRUST EN-
FORCEMENT 18 (2003) available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/business/new-antitrtist/
papers/PLlmar03.pdf. For other discussions regarding the coordinated efforts of these
officials, see Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys Gen-
eral as National Policymakers, 56 REV. POL. 525 (1994); Joseph F. Zimmerman, Interstate
Cooperation: The Roles of the State Attorneys General, 28 PUBLIUS 71 (1998); Jason Lynch,
Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys General in Multistate Liti-
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Third, this enriched story of American federalism gives insight
into evaluations of CAFA's impact. In an earlier Part of this Article, I
set forth different assessments, some celebratory and others bemoan-
ing the enactment. I suggest that the measurement of CAFA will vary
with time. In the short term, CAFA's immediate import is less power-
ful because it works in conjunction with other efforts limiting access to
rights assertion. At the local level, many states have also cut back on
remedies; at the national level, CAFA is part of several statutory and
doctrinal developments operating through different rubrics such as
preemption and mandatory arbitration. Rather than layered, coop-
erative federalism, we are seeing efforts to generate a more exclusive
form of nationalism based on assertions of a need for uniformity that
are made in Congress, in agencies, and by the Supreme Court.
Moving toward a slightly longer time frame, an intermediate
evaluation of CAFA's impact depends in no small measure on the out-
come of the 2008 election. Given the many pending bills to preempt
state law, the extent of the federalization of state tort and consumer
law hangs in part on who sits in Congress and in the White House, as
well as who obtains governorships. More generally, both the pressures
for nationalization as well as the content of the rules prescribed will be
affected.
In the longer term, the framing of federalism I have offered is a
reminder that we are in "medias res"-in the middle of the story.
Congress, in CAFA and elsewhere, aided by federal judges and other
rulemakers, may try to codify a set of problems as "national," but the
world in which they are operating contests that category. Pulls from
localities working hard to help people obtain goods and services with a
measure of security, and the transformation of political orders outside
our borders, make plain that most of our problems-the economy,
the environment, physical safety, and national security-do not re-
spect the boundaries of our shores. Claims to reallocate authority in
service of a better way will be made again, and one should not assume
that this particular resting place is permanent.
Rather, the category "national" is unstable, as are distinctions be-
tween "commerce" and "manufacturing," between "direct" and "indi-
rect" effects on commerce, and between what falls within or beyond
the "police powers" of states. As one watches the movements back and
forth between nationalization and devolution in arenas ranging from
gation, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1998 (2001); Note, To Form a More Peifect Union?: Federalism
and Informal Interstate Cooperation, 102 HARV. L. REv. 842 (1989).
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banking, securities, and insurance to education and marriage, it seems
apt to borrow from William Butler Yeats that the "center cannot
hold. 1 62 While I can certainly understand the claims made by nation-
alists about the need for national economic policy and the costs of frag-
mentation, 6 3 we also are part of international and local economies.
The effort to assert unilateral sovereign control, unaffected by local or
transnational rules, cannot succeed. A sense of the sovereign center,
equated with the national government of the United States, exercising
exclusive authority to set regulatory parameters, is ephemeral.
162 W.B. YFATS, The Second Coming, in W.B. YEAvTS: THE POEMS 187, 187 (RichardJ.
Finneran ed., 1983).
163 See, e.g., Hal S. Scott, Federalism and Financial Regulation, in FEDERAL PREEMP-
TION, supra note 65, at 139. Further, many commentators with different points of view
argue that national (or state-based) policies are "better" for consumers. See, e.g., Tho-
mas W. Hazlett, Federal Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION,
supra note 65, at 113.
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